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Abstract The reappearance of the tram in French cities
over the past 20 years has stimulated innovation. Ensuring
the attractiveness of this transit mode has meant conveying
a distinctly modern image of the system. Inherent in the
resurgence of this transit mode, a safety device, in the form
of a monitoring system (the ‘‘dead-man device’’ in rail
parlance) intended to mitigate risks related to driver
blackout, has been reconfigured. This new device, inspired
by subway systems, has been introduced without inciting
any real inquiry into either the benefits or consequences, in
terms of the conductor’s role and transport safety, arising
from such an alternative form of tramway monitoring. An
analysis of the process by which the mode of monitoring
has been implemented serves to examine and reconsider, at
least in part, the certification and regulatory system that
accompanies tramway renovation projects in France.
Keywords Tramway  Safety  Design 
Working conditions  Dead-man control
1 Introduction
Some objects seem so intertwined with a particular land-
scape that doubting their pertinence or shape would be out
of context. Their presence is so plainly obvious that they
simply blend into the scenery itself and can no longer be
distinguished. In order to make such objects stand out from
the background, an event would have to arise that upsets
the scenery, that to a certain extent makes it look foreign.
When this occurs, the object loses its natural and imper-
ceptible character and can once again be targeted. This is
the process that Chklovski refers to as ‘‘the estrangement
of objects’’1 that is apparently capable of ‘‘providing an
effective antidote to a risk shared by all of us, namely
taking reality (even our own) as a certitude’’ (Ginzburg
2001). Under such conditions, the evidence available may
be questioned.
We had to face this kind of situation when along came
the invention of a new type of urban transit vehicle: the
bus–tram hybrid, a streetcar running on tires, in other
words an intermediate vehicle (between bus and tram).
Featuring a hybrid design with adjustable axles fitted with
tires and capable of being guided by a central rail or driven
using a steering wheel, this vehicle resembles the bat in
Jean de La Fontaine’s fable that, depending on the cir-
cumstances, can assume the form of either a mouse or a
bird. This bus–tram configuration not only carried with it
the innovation of breaking down the barriers that separate
road and rail vehicles, but of calling into question the very
notion of guidance.
Even if all bus–tram vehicles offer the same character-
istic of dissociating guidance from rolling on a roadway, as
opposed to genuine tramways with rails that serve for both
guidance and rolling motion, all have not necessarily
adopted either the same technique for gripping this guid-
ance rail or the same strategy regarding the exchangeability
between driving modes.
Some have opted for a mechanical clamping to a central
rail (e.g., the TVR system by Bombardier, Translohr by
Lohr Industrie), which presupposes that the vehicle comes
to a stop prior to proceeding with a driving mode change,
while others have chosen a type of rail grip without any
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mechanical friction (e.g., Siemens’ optical guidance,
magnetic control of a preprogrammed trajectory on the
Phileas tram produced by the Dutch company APTS). This
latter option, inappropriately referred to as ‘‘immaterial’’,
authorizes an instantaneous mode change from a technical
standpoint, even though this capability proves more com-
plex from an actual driver’s perspective (Doniol-Shaw
et al. 2005).
This new type of vehicle, capable of being driven using
two modes as different as a roadway and rail guidance, has
however not been fitted with all the safety features man-
dated for guided systems. It has been equipped with neither
any kind of sweep guard, i.e., a passive safety device de-
signed to avoid running over pedestrians or cyclists who
may have been projected in front the moving vehicle, nor
the monitoring control still known under the name ‘‘dead-
man device’’. Such a function is programmed to stop the
vehicle should the driver be incapacitated to a point of
making him unable to perform system supervision duties,
thereby activating the emergency brake.
The absence of such safety features stems from the fact
that the transit authority, assigned to oversee application of
vehicle certification and regulation, considered the capa-
bility of being operated as a road vehicle sufficient to dictate
this mode as the reference and only submitted them to road-
based certification, thus eliminating the rail-guided mode
from the evaluation. This narrow view imposed the obli-
gation that the steering wheel remain active at all times,2
whether the vehicle is being driven in road traffic or guided
on a rail, even though when rail-guided the presence of an
active wheel compromises safety,3 without serving any
navigational purpose. It would take the disastrous startup of
the Bombardier bus–tram, marked by a succession of
accidents and the subsequent shutdown of operations for a
whole year to improve system safety within the Nancy
metropolitan area (eastern France) in January 2001, for the
authority to become aware of the importance of the guided
mode and its unique set of problems.
Revision to the regulatory code specific to urban rail
transit safety, necessitated by the requirement to adapt
French legislation to comply with European directives in
the aim of creating a single European market, has provided
the opportunity for the French government to alter its po-
sition so as to better manage such innovative contexts in
which the boundaries between modes lack stability. This
process of rewriting the standards that shape urban transit
services has led to deleting all reference to rail, by
substituting the term ‘‘guided mode’’. From a practical
perspective, this modification has resulted in the de facto
abrogation of the decree issued on 22 March, 1942 that
‘‘applied public administration regulations to the policing,
safety and operations of rail services designed to benefit the
general and local population’’ and its replacement by the 9
May, 2003 decree ‘‘relative to the safety of guided transit
services’’. Since then, tramways are no longer associated
with railways, but merely considered as ‘‘public transit
vehicles constrained to permanently follow a predeter-
mined trajectory attached to one or several physical rails
running along the roadway’’. In the process that substituted
guided vehicles for tramways, not only had the terminology
changed, but the philosophy and economics behind system
control as well.
The transition has thus been made from a management
principle based on explicit standards, such as the obligation
to equip vehicles with a sweep guard or a monitoring de-
vice, to a management practice built upon procedures
requiring system supervisors to ensure that: ‘‘Any new
guided transit system or any modification to an existing
system must be designed and constructed such that the
overall level of safety with respect to users, operating staff
and third parties is at least equivalent to the present level of
safety or that of existing systems that provide comparable
services’’. This transition introduces the principle that goes
by the acronym GAME (for globally at least the same), in
which standards are no longer explicit but instead pro-
grammed into the technical components of situations
adopted as references, which now places the emphasis on
evaluating a new system’s overall performance by means of
comparison with a previous system taken as the standard.
The complexity of this new procedure, coupled with
uncertainties relative to the modes for evaluating the level
of safety reached, has incited Lohr Industrie to abandon its
bimodal driving function on its Translohr vehicle, which
has become the first guided vehicle running on tires to be
compared with a conventional tramway. The reference
situation chosen for this ‘‘tramway on tires’’ will in fact be
a tram car rolling on a rail track, i.e., the Citadis produced
by Alstom, which boasts a recent design and like the
Translohr model has a low floor throughout.
Our role comes into play against this backdrop and
consists of conducting an expert evaluation of the Trans-
lohr design and, more specifically, of its driver’s cab. The
request was formulated by the Labor Management Com-
mittee4 of the urban transit network operator for the City of2 As opposed to a situation in which the steering wheel is disengaged
when the vehicle is being guided, thereby sparing the driver from
seeing the wheel turn by itself with every curve along the transit
route.
3 Such was the observation issued by the Transport Ministry unit
assigned to carry out a technical assessment of these vehicles sub-
sequent to a series of derailment-caused accidents.
4 The Labor Management Committee is a body representing company
personnel and has been granted the prerogative to, among other
things, request a third-party expert evaluation when introducing new
technologies.
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Clermont-Ferrand (central France), once the Translohr had
been selected to run on the city’s future tramway line. This
evaluation quickly raised the issue of installing the moni-
toring or dead-man device not only on the Translohr, but
also on the latest generation of tramways rolling on railway
track (Citadis by Alstom, Eurotram by Bombardier or even
the Siemens’ tram–train), in which direction we extended
our assessment on behalf of the Transport Ministry, as part
of a search for improved safety.
2 Methodological considerations
The analysis was conducted by a sequence of steps, each of
which systematically involved the set of pertinent actors.
These steps consisted of:
An analysis of documentary data on Translohr, as fur-
nished by the vehicle designer;
A comparative analysis of driver cab design for the
various tramways and their evolution since service startup:
meetings held with heads of the targeted network opera-
tions, interviews with drivers, accompaniment inside the
cab over full or partial transit routes, and photo and video
recordings;
Vehicle tests conducted at the experimental site of the
Translohr manufacturer, using both tram operators expe-
rienced in driving different types of vehicles and bus
drivers with the Clermont-Ferrand transit network, who
were to become future Translohr drivers.
Organization of a daylong session devoted to tramway
safety and cab design, combining input from various actors
in the transit field: network managers, drivers, experts,
State agency representatives, etc.
Interviews with the heads of a number of evaluation and
control bodies specialized in guided transit safety, coupled
with an analysis of regulatory changes.
3 A new ‘‘dead-man’s control’’ goes unnoticed?
The initial conditions behind development of the Translohr
vehicle, in the aim of enabling bimodal operations, i.e.,
road (bus-driving mode) or guided (tram driving mode),
and the later switch in favor of the guided mode exclu-
sively served to influence ultimate vehicle design. Several
of the features we observed in the driver’s cab plainly
expose this vehicle’s hybrid origins. Just like in a bus, the
control panel has been positioned to the left and the trac-
tion/braking control requires operating two pedals, whereas
modern tram systems are laid out with the control panel
centered in the cab and the traction/braking controlled by a
hand-held throttle, as inspired by train or metro design. It
should also be noted that the control panel occupies the
space devoted to the steering wheel, directly in front of the
driver, while this space always remains uncluttered in a
conventional tram cab.
A monitoring system has been integrated into the dri-
ver’s cab in order to comply with guided system regula-
tions, which repeats the obligation in effect on tramways to
be equipped with a ‘‘special device, of a type certified by
the Minister’s cabinet, capable of stopping the train in the
event the conductor becomes incapacitated’’.5 In terms of
safety, this monitoring system constitutes an extreme
emergency safeguard as also reflected in the widely used
term ‘‘dead-man device’’. Yet for the Translohr vehicle,
this equipment obligation meant a new requirement with
respect to the initial hybrid version, for which (as indicated
above) no monitoring system had been mandated by reg-
ulation.
Adding such a safeguard on Translohr does not appear
to cause any special problem since France’s rail industry
has relied upon comparable measures for a considerable
time. The cumulative experience acquired is substantial, as
monitoring systems have been used on trains for the SNCF
railway company since 1965, on subway cars since the
1970s and on trams since their reintroduction in 1985.
Given the lack of negative lessons from experiences
with existing systems, the manufacturer of the new tram-
way system running on tires has decided to adopt the
functional architecture of the devices implemented on the
most recent tramways and to unite the set of elements that
have already successfully undergone certification proce-
dures. The manufacturer elected to install a manually
controlled monitoring function, in the form of pushbuttons
located on both sides of the control panel, where pushing
on either button serves to activate the monitoring mode.
The pushbuttons resemble those used on existing SNCF
systems. This control is linked with a time delay mecha-
nism borrowed from Alstom’s Citadis model, established
as the reference in terms of safety level, by virtue of the
GAME principle mentioned above. This time delay
authorizes holding the button down at most 15 s (13 s
before triggering a buzzer and then 2 s until the emergency
brake gets applied) or a release of at most 4 s (2 before the
buzzer and another 2 before the emergency brake).
It has gone unnoticed that the use of these various
components, which have been validated and certified on
other types of rolling stock, and installation of this ‘‘dead-
man device’’ in this new tram car running on tires, con-
stitutes an innovation in device design and, more broadly,
in the design of the driver’s cab. This innovation, which
pertains to the driving task, has skirted the perception of
vehicle designers, who are basically more concerned with
5 Article 30 of the 22 March, 1942 decree.
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technical system performance and compliance with certi-
fication procedures.
The presence however of a time-delayed detection de-
vice (VACMA6), which is hand-activated on a tram with a
pedal-operated traction/braking control, raises an ‘‘anom-
aly’’ within the world of tramways. All sorts of combina-
tions exist (or at least existed) between traction/braking
control and the dead-man device (in association with the
hand-held throttle, with or without a foot-activated com-
plementary system, and pedal-operated monitoring and
traction/braking controls), but never in over one hundred
years of electric tram history has a tram car been designed
with a pedal-operated traction/braking control and a hand-
activated monitoring system. The oddest aspect is that this
invention, whose effectiveness cannot be assessed up front,
arose practically by accident and hence came to fruition
amidst indifference. From the time its technical operations
had been validated, no questioning on the part of transit
drivers was considered appropriate. The theoretical func-
tion of this particular device shields, to a certain extent, its
actual effectiveness (Sigaut 1991).
This operational transparency in the design of a transit
driver’s cab underscores the way in which technical objects
are conceived with respect to referenced certified objects.
Such references serve to circumvent a more in-depth con-
sideration of functional features and uses. The lack of
knowledge of an object’s functional bases no longer stands
as a problem. Imitation becomes a resource in the drive to
reproduce existing systems without having to pursue fur-
ther investigation. The GAME principle, which France has
proposed to Europe for the purpose of offering an alter-
native to the mere probabilistic approach to safety, could
lend support for such processes even if, in theory, their
application presumes a reexamination of both the problem
and the intended solution.
Nonetheless, this avoidance of questioning an innova-
tion within an ultimate emergency device, which elicits
special attention, is not necessarily as odd as it may seem
given the rather limited knowledge of this system in
France. Such a situation is derived from at least two fac-
tors. First of all, France has only rediscovered surface rail
transit quite recently (1985) and, consequently, was no
longer making use of control devices capable of central-
izing learning gleaned from experience. It would take
waiting until the creation in 2001 of the STRMTG agency
specialized in ski lifts and guided transportation services,
which incited the constitution in 2004 of a database on all
tram-related accidents. Yet, up until now, no dead-man
event has resulted in a database entry. Secondly, the
hypothesis of the absence of accidents implicating the
VACMA (dead-man) system might explain why this device
has remained relatively neglected. None of the operators
we met with could recall a case where the dead-man system
actually served the cause of transportation safety.
A classical paradox is thus at play herein: the lack of
knowledge through feedback stems from the very lack of
experience. In order to overcome this paradox, it would be
necessary to cease the fixation on the exceptional event,
i.e., the accident, and instead focus on day-to-day behavior
in order to understand how, under ordinary working con-
ditions, the perception of these devices is generated
(Amalberti and Barriquault 1999). By means of tangible
expressions for appropriating these technical objects, the
deviation and incompatibility between standards and
practices starts to take shape. Driver statements on these
deviations thereby enable reexamining such instruments.
4 A hand-held throttle being continuously revamped
The observation of this ordinary use of dead-man devices
has been conducted on four transit networks chosen
according to two distinct criteria.7 On the one hand, we
gave precedence to those networks featuring trams whose
traction/braking controls involved a pedal assembly, in
order to provide a basis for comparison with the Translohr
vehicle, which was the focus of our appraisal mission. Two
networks met this criterion quite well. On the other hand,
we selected networks with previous experience in the
acquisition of a second generation of trams so as to
examine how experience had led to learning in terms of
both the design of dead-man systems and traction/braking
controls. We selected three cases whereby, to varying de-
grees and with varying levels of formalism, network
operators included drivers in their efforts to reconfigure the
vehicle control cabin.
The initial observation derived is that the first generation
of hand-held throttle equipment, with integration of the
dead-man system, was not fully satisfactory from the
drivers’ standpoint. The ordering of new equipment made it
possible for positive criticism to be vented. It can be re-
marked that all proposed modifications are oriented to-
wards reducing the ergonomic constraints induced by the
shape of the throttle, which constantly occupies the same
hand in performing several actions.
In the case of the standard French tram in use on the
Paris system, criticism was aimed at hand-held throttle
activation as well as the ergonomic constraints associated
with the dead-man activation, even though its design did
6 VACMA: French acronym for an onboard ‘‘dead-man’’ surveillance
system.
7 The minutes from these visits are part of the public record and may
be downloaded from the following Website: http://latts.cnrs.fr/site/
p_lattsperso.php?Id=767&style=&col=.
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allow for various grip angles (see Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4). It should
be pointed out that this throttle design was inspired from
the Lyon metro system without considering the differences
in use when placed on a tramway. In particular, the fact
that the metro’s automatic pilot practically made the hand-
held throttle and dead-man device superfluous was com-
pletely overlooked. The consequence of this contextual
transfer was that tram drivers on systems equipped with
such a throttle developed musculoskeletal disorders
affecting their hands, wrists, arms and shoulders.
This reexamination led to producing a rotary hand-held
throttle fitted with a sensitive contact for the dead-man
function. Yet, it could be observed that the action ‘‘script’’
incited by the shape of the object (Akrich 1987), i.e., taking
control of the throttle in the palm of the hand and a thumb-
triggered contact (Figs. 5, 6), cannot be performed
smoothly and efficiently. Instead, the sideways, clasped
hand position often tends to be preferred (Figs. 7, 8), in
association with the pedal activation of the dead-man
function that was requested by drivers. The problem then of
potential inaccessibility to the dead-man actuator coupled
with the hand-held throttle has thus been averted. Conse-
quently, no critical feedback on hand-held throttle design is
to be gleaned, even if its use does not entirely correspond
with designer expectations.
In Strasbourg, a city equipped with the Eurotram cars,
the hand-held throttle, positioned on the left armrest of the
driver’s seat (Fig. 9), was not appreciated primarily be-
cause of the pronounced difficulty involved in using the
armrest to relax the forearm while operating the throttle
(Figs. 10, 11). Moreover, the presence and placement of
both the bell and dead-man device on the throttle consid-
erably constrained the driver’s hand and forearm position,
which was the focal point of the criticisms lodged. The
selected model was inspired from the ‘‘joystick’’ controls
in place on the Combino tramway, produced by Siemens. It
should be pointed out that on the Combino design, used in
Freiburg (Germany), this throttle also serves to monitor
driver vigilance. The traction and braking controls elimi-
nate the need to activate an autonomous dead-man device.
As the tram is traveling along at coasting speed, i.e., when
the throttle is idle, the driver must still keep it held down.
Nonetheless, the proposal of directly using the throttle as a
source of information on the driver’s active presence and
thereby avoiding association with any specific device,
while still forwarded, did not win support for ‘‘technical’’
reasons.
Included in this redefinition of the traction/braking
control around a joystick, the possibility of creating a
throttle position that does not correspond with ‘‘neutral’’
(but instead with one of pre-braking without being en-
gaged) will be retained. This position, intermediate be-
tween neutral and braking, ‘‘discovered’’ on the Eurotram
hand-held throttle by system drivers, enables preparing the
tramcar for a braking maneuver without actually triggering
the brake and is moreover considered as extremely
important for safety purposes, since accident prevention
depends to a great extent on driver reaction speed during
braking. At present, this position is not physically distin-
guished over the range of throttle movement; it corre-
sponds to a position described using pejorative
terminology: ‘‘neither neutral, nor engaging the braking
circuits’’. On Alstom’s Citadis, this throttle position in
anticipation of braking also exists, by positioning away
from neutral without engaging the brake. The equivalent of
this layout on a pedal-operated tramway yields a form of
Figs. 1–4 Standard throttle with dead-man device: two operator positions, for activating the dead-man device and traction
Figs. 5–8 The Citadis rotary throttle, in both its theoretical and practical applications
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driving called ‘‘preventive’’, which consists of releasing
traction and coasting as soon as possible, while the driver is
moving his foot in front of the brake pedal.
One more point on this topic of braking: the possibility
also exists on the current Eurotram hand-held throttle to
unlock the emergency brake during operations. This device
serves to take advantage of a strong braking force when
initiating deceleration, while avoiding a brake lock and
causing an abrupt stop inside the passenger compartment.
Keep in mind that the majority of bodily injury accidents
occur inside the tramcar; it is thus crucial to give the driver
ample margin to determine whether or not to pursue an
emergency braking maneuver. The request has been sub-
mitted to renew this functional feature in the future joystick
device.
It may be noticed however that this joystick embodies,
just like the former throttle, an entire array of functions
(traction/braking, emergency brake release, monitoring and
alarm). There are grounds to fear therefore that such a
concentration of controls increases the ergonomic con-
straints placed on the left arm and, as a result, rekindles
criticisms directed to the former throttle.
5 A remarkable exception
In contrast with these experiences, the renewal of equip-
ment on Saint-Etienne’s network (an average-sized
metropolitan area located in central France) can be char-
acterized by sustained stability in the design of both trac-
tion/braking controls and dead-man activation. This
stability proves even more remarkable given that as op-
posed to the Strasbourg or Paris tramway networks, the
Saint-Etienne system has always run a tramway ever since
the end of the nineteenth century (1881), with pedal-
operated tram cars being introduced in 1959.
During discussions held with drivers during the 1990s
for the purpose of laying out new equipment, no negative
feedback permeated, as regards the existing system that
would have incited preference for a hand-held throttle.
Conveying the same perceptions on both types of devices,
intended to work in unison on the tramline, swayed the
decision to renew this pedal-operated control option. The
mechanics of new pedal assemblies proved over time to be
simpler than the former ones, due to the introduction of
electronic controls. Similarly, the pedal-activated dead-
man system was kept as is. The pressure applied on this
pedal with the left foot must be constant and sufficient to
hold it down halfway whenever the tram is moving. A
‘‘hard point’’ in the dead-man pedal stroke enables posi-
tioning the pedal at the comfortable angle. Any pressure
beyond this stop point or any pressure release would
immediately trigger the emergency brake. No time delay is
programmed between the detection of inadequate pedal
pressure, whether the system is of the buzzer type or any
other, and the initiation of braking. After a few adjust-
ments, the drivers felt comfortable with the new pedal
assembly rather quickly.
It strikes us that this high level of technical stability is a
rare enough occurrence to be remarked and examined, all
the more so given that the overall appearance of the
‘‘modern’’ pedal-oriented driver’s cab does not resemble
the previous generation of PCC equipment. Between the
two, design changes in the driver’s cab seem to have been
very stark. It can even be said that everything has changed,
including the design of the acceleration pedal and espe-
cially the braking pedal, except for the dead-man system.
Without necessarily knowing the reasons that influenced
this initial choice, our sense is that beyond upholding
perceptions or behavioral patterns, the design of this dead-
man system meets the sensorial and cognitive demands
placed on a driving task, in which various functions are
assigned to the two feet. It would, in fact, prove most
difficult for the driver to regulate with his right foot trac-
tion/braking actions, while using the left to operate an
‘‘active’’ dead-man system based on a monotonic cadence.
Constant pressure on the pedal can be viewed as a sort of
stable ‘‘background’’ task that drivers are able to assimi-
late. The fact that a position change immediately triggers
braking, and not a preliminary alarm to entice the driver to
perform a recovery action, appears to offer an additional
safety feature. The hypothesis can be forwarded that a foot
Figs. 9–11 Eurotram control cab—throttle, alarm and dead-man—action on the throttle
Cogn Tech Work
123
position change on the dead-man pedal corresponds to both
an abrupt change in environmental conditions and an in-
crease in the requirements for handling the situation. In this
case, the consequences of a foot movement on the
dead-man’s pedal, which serves to brake the vehicle
immediately, constitutes a safety system adapted not only
to driver-specific problems (drowsiness, malaise, etc.) but
also to abnormal situations from an environmental stand-
point, in that it leads to stopping the vehicle (or, to coin a
functional safety expression, to secure the vehicle).
5.1 Imitation as a general rule, independently
of the context
By virtue of these few examples, the role of imitation may
be perceived within the innovation process; this occurs
both consciously and subconsciously. Those elements that
have successfully worked elsewhere get easily incorpo-
rated, yet such an incorporation step takes place without
reexamination of the contextual differences and without
updating the meaning of the target object from the vantage
point of its intended purpose.
Yet the most important point herein is that feedback
crystallizes around the local definition of an object, be-
tween a network and an equipment manufacturer. All dis-
cussions held at this critical juncture do not give rise to any
written record. The only objective trace they leave is their
‘‘translation’’ in the new form taken by the technical de-
vice (Callon 1986). This new object then gets assimilated,
from the perspective of its rationality, with two distinct
frameworks, depending on whether it is used at the site
where critical design discussions were held or whether it
becomes an option in the manufacturer’s catalogue. In the
latter case, the object goes unnoticed. Feedback is no
longer meaningful; it merely gets engulfed in the physical
form of the object, which can no longer yield input as to the
reasons and forces behind its creation. Feedback therefore
is not being ascribed any social pertinence, and devices that
have been heavily critiqued in several places can be seen to
proliferate. Here lies an insight into how the recently
inaugurated and innovative Bordeaux tramway system,8
which uses Alstom’s Citadis model, is equipped with the
linear throttle that was rejected by the Citadis drivers
working in Paris.
6 ‘‘Dead-man’’ hypotheses: between functionality
and belief
This failure to question the reasons that incited tramway
networks to request modifications to the dead-man device
underlies a general void in challenging the device’s func-
tionality. To clarify this point, let’s go back to the technical
object itself, its material nature, shape and operability. Like
for any technical object, monitoring systems propose an
action ‘‘script’’ that transposes designer hypotheses on
‘‘elements making up the setting where the object is to
enter’’ (Akrich 1987). The risk of human failure lies at the
heart of such safety measures, yet when examining the
various systems we are confronted with a multitude of
hypotheses, some in contradiction with others, on the
characteristics of human failure. To better understand this
paradox, it is first necessary to describe the range of sys-
tems involved and explain the hypotheses behind percep-
tion and failure physically embodied in the systems
created.
7 Several system designs for the various theories
on human failure
According to the first such monitoring system, the transit
driver must continuously activate the controls. Any release,
regardless of whether or not a time delay has been intro-
duced, transforms either existing situation by engaging the
emergency brake.
According to the second system, the driver must alter-
natively press and release the monitoring control: this is the
so-called ‘‘VACMA’’ system invented in the 1960s that
requires holding down a pushbutton. The time delay al-
lowed for the pressure or release action varies from one
network to the next, yet most values lie on the order of 12 s
maximum for holding the pushbutton down and 2 s max-
imum for button release. Should a driver hold the button
down more than 12 s on the controls or release it for more
than 2 s, a buzzer will sound, after which time action needs
to be carried out within 2 s or else the emergency brake
gets activated. Strasbourg has the only transit network that
opted for a device designed to react indifferently to holding
down or releasing the pushbutton. The driver can only
maintain the button in the same position for at most 8 s,
otherwise an initial alarm sounds; should the driver fail to
change button position within 2 s, a second alarm is trig-
gered with a quicker buzz than the first, and the driver has
just 2 more seconds to react prior to emergency brake
activation.
While both of these systems seek to determine the same
type of information, i.e., eventual incapacitation of the
driver, their strategies vary as a result of differing theories
8 The innovation here pertains to the mode for supplying the tramway
with electricity over a portion of the itinerary, and in particular
through the historic section of the city and on a number of narrow
streets, by making use of supply routed via the ground and avoiding
overhead wires.
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about human behavior, which may be explained as
follows.
With the continuous-pressure system, the theory remains
rather simple. If the driver experiences a malaise or falls
into a deep sleep, he releases the button; any release
therefore must automatically be interpreted as human
failure, at which point triggering the emergency brake
constitutes the sole means for making the system safe. The
faster this release is recognized, then the faster the vehicle
can be secured. The 2-s time delay between release of the
monitoring device and engaging the emergency brake, as
adopted on the Nantes tramway (western France), intro-
duces a second hypothesis: the potential for device ino-
perability without necessarily any physiological breakdown
on the part of the driver. This time delay gives the driver a
chance to rectify ‘‘faulty manipulation’’. Human behavior
theory adds the complication of a possible failure of just
the action and not the human being. Yet since button re-
lease serves as the designated failure signal, the automaton
only grants a limited number of seconds for the subject to
correct his ‘‘faulty maneuver’’.
According to the system that verifies human contact
with the pushbutton (VACMA), the theory here becomes
more complex that the time delay implemented on the
Nantes tramway, as the procedure does not recognize that a
release action has failed (since the operator is requested to
release whether or not he is experiencing a malaise), but
merely requires intervals to be regular and very closely-
spaced. The asymmetric time delay (12-then-2 s) under-
scores the fact that pushbutton release, more than
maintained contact, is considered as the potential sign of
failure. The frequency with which the button must be
released remains however a most intriguing parameter:
how are these values actually justified?
When questioning rail experts on such a justification, we
went away none the wiser. Several competing ‘‘indige-
nous’’ theories are heard on the rationality behind this set-
up and the applicable time delays. For some, the release
allows ensuring that a driver does not stay ‘‘clenched’’ on
the throttle if indeed he has become unconscious. Others
however, and these would primarily include device man-
ufacturers cite the benefit of preventing ‘‘cheating’’. The
time delay differences observed between trains (55/5 s),
metro cars or the tram–train recently inaugurated in France
(30/2 s), and tramway systems (12/2 s) apparently stem
from differences in: vehicle weight, braking distances, and
safety intervals. Yet when this rationale gets examined
more thoroughly, its practicality is seriously challenged
since within an urban setting, 4 s are more than sufficient
to run a red light and cross an intersection. The theory most
often raised to justify the dead-man (VACMA) control
considerably modifies the actual function: the goal would
be less concerned with sounding a failure warning than
with ensuring ongoing driver vigilance. This shift in
emphasis away from monitoring and in favor of vigilance
is quite commonplace and may be found, for example, in
operating safety regulations as well as in comments by
experts, and not just in France.9
As a final hypothesis and one supported by VACMA
system operations on the Strasbourg network (which calls
for pushing and releasing the control button symmetri-
cally), human failure can be evidenced by clenching as
well as by release.
7.1 The unspoken hypothesis of cheating?
We have thus explored four configurations of the ‘‘dead-
man’’ system. While three of them operate according to an
easily explainable theory, the last one remains harder to
decipher. VACMA’s asymmetric time delay, broken down
into 12 s holding the button down and 2 s for its release, is
not grounded in any actual theory, or instead is too heavily
steeped in theory to be convincing.
The vigilance control theory, which gets cited most of-
ten to justify the VACMA system, still seems disconnected
from reality. It has been regularly found that this system’s
function is not to monitor vigilance, as a recent accident
once again attests.
On 30 August, 2004 along the Rouen (northern France)
tramway line, one tramcar rammed into another stopped at
a station. The investigation conducted by the Land Trans-
port Office reached the following conclusion: ‘‘Human
error caused the accident. The hypothesis of being over-
come by a sudden malaise was initially examined before
giving way to the much more likely hypothesis of the
driver’s diminished state of vigilance following the onset
of drowsiness’’.10 For such an accident to arise, during
which the driver engaged the VACMA device at least twice
without actually seeing the car ahead, serves as a reminder
that ‘‘the only reliable information it (VACMA) can de-
liver about the driver would be whether or not he is
physically present in the cab’’.
9 The same confusion reigns in other countries as well, as cited in this
reference work from the British rail sector, which defines the dead-
man system as follows: ‘‘A more sophisticated system was designed
in the 1960s, typically defined as a safety device for the driver or a
vigilance monitoring feature. Its operations assume that the driver
demonstrates his vigilance by periodically pushing a button located
on the control console or by pressing a specially-designated pedal’’,
in Simmons Jack, Biddle Gordon (eds) (1997) The Oxford companion
to British railway history: from 1603 to the 1990s. Oxford University
Press, p 125.
10 Technical investigation report on the tramway accident in Rouen
on 30 August, 2004, June 2005—BEA-TT Report—no 2004–2007.
This document is available on the Transport Ministry website: http://
www.equipement.gouv.fr/article.php3?id_article=569.
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Yet unless organizational conditions change, it is en-
tirely possible that this conclusion once again goes unheard
by the bodies responsible for ensuring safety on guided
transit systems. For nearly 15 years now, it is a well-known
experimental finding that a loss of vigilance is not
incompatible with continued performance of a repetitive
motion. The research carried out has revealed: ‘‘During
these moments of reduced vigilance, increases are observed
in both the frequency and duration of pedal releases’’.
Researchers went on to note that: ‘‘During phases when
vigilance wanes, which should be considered as physio-
logical states, we observed response failures to speed limit
or stop signals’’ (Mollard et al. 1991). The dead-man
monitoring system can thus be ‘‘normally’’ activated by
transit drivers without necessarily suggestive of a bona fide
state of vigilance.
This result was contained in nearly the same terms
within the initial set of VACMA specifications, since one
of the three underlying conditions to be satisfied was:
‘‘unconscious activation by the driver, who was not to be
encumbered by the tedious constraint imposed by an
incessantly-repeated manipulation’’ (Ribeill 1997).
To better understand this capacity for a ‘‘theory’’ to
predominate while failing to stand the test of either facts or
scientific experiment, it is probably necessary to seek
explanation from the specifications drafted by the SNCF
Railway during the 1960s that treated the topic with
frankness. VACMA, invented in 1965, did not originally
stem from any physiological controversy, but rather from a
more pragmatic concern on the part of company engineers
to avoid the type of ‘‘cheating’’ that had been occurring
with the device then in use on network trains, which con-
sisted of a hoop installed underneath the traction wheel that
the driver was required to grip along with the wheel. A
simple strap could take the place of manual action, thereby
allowing the driver to freely move about within the cab,
which for non-stop trips lasting several hours would seem
like an attractive option. The release designed into the
system therefore merely serves to ensure no cheating by
delivering a constant pressure signal (Ribeill 1997). A
quick release time can be viewed as a necessary compro-
mise, since the signal that verifies compliance of the
mandatory action is the same as that notifying eventual
driver blackout.
The emergence of a veritable vigilance control theory,
with no way of knowing exactly when, came about sub-
sequent to the invention of VACMA, which was built on
the basis of both a physiological hypothesis (i.e., failure
manifested by control release) and moral hypothesis
(cheating prevention). The fact that this approach to
monitoring partially replaced the original theory can likely
be explained in the difficulty experienced by transit
facility managers to justify to network operators lasting
constraints imposed upon them out of suspicion of po-
tential cheating.
In reconfiguring this double theoretical basis for the
‘‘dead-man’’ device around physiological and moral con-
siderations, the unspoken controversy shrouded beneath the
device’s actual physical form from one system to the next
can ultimately be clarified. A straightforward rating makes
it possible to contrast the competing hypotheses on human
operations and behavior observed on urban transit systems
using three types of set-ups.
For the Nantes and Saint-Etienne networks, operator
cheating is not an issue and human failure is signaled by a
release of body pressure; monitoring by means of constant
pressure indeed proves sufficient.
For the Strasbourg network, cheating is not a problem
either, yet bodily behavior causes some uncertainty. Failure
can be manifested by clenching as well as by release. A
VACMA timed with a symmetric delay between push-
button pressure and release therefore becomes necessary.
For networks in Paris, Grenoble, Lyon, Bordeaux,
Montpellier and elsewhere, cheating can pose a problem
and failure can be recognized by bodily release. A VAC-
MA device with asymmetric delay (short time for push-
button release compared with the time the button needs to
be held down) would thus be required.
Once formulated as such, the controversy among dead-
man devices could be settled quite easily apparently. From
the standpoint of public safety, it would simply be neces-
sary to discuss the rationale behind each one of these
hypotheses.
Does human failure result in release or clenching?
Outside the realm of scary fiction and horror movies, the
hypothesis favoring release is the only one with medical
validity.
Is cheating really a problem? Whether in Nantes or
Saint-Etienne, both of which have adopted a constant-
pressure type of monitoring for their trams, no report of
cheating problems with devices has surfaced. The differ-
ences between interurban trains and tramways could ex-
plain this situation. For one thing, the technical potential
for cheating without getting caught by management is even
lower since a supervisor can enter the driver’s cab at any
point along the transit itinerary. Moreover, travel times
between two stops are short, on the order of just a couple
minutes, and drivers are not inclined to circumvent a de-
vice that is not ostensibly bothersome.
From a safety perspective, automated monitoring sys-
tems like that used in Saint-Etienne thus guarantee the best
level of reactivity in case of human failure, since the issue
of cheating does not get raised within the context of an
urban tramway. And yet, current trends would call for
standardizing those systems offering the least efficient
form of safety.
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8 Conclusion
Via this tramway example and the onboard ‘‘dead-man’’
device, it becomes clear that the meanders in the design of
a system, in comparison with its initial functional purpose,
are not strictly due to a standoff between drivers on one
side and systems designers and managers on the other, yet
are still capable of steering all actors down the path of
‘‘wild solutions’’ (Amalberti and Barriquault 1999) in-
vented to transform and adapt productive systems. This
drift in design is imperceptible because it stems from an
accumulation over time of minor transformations and the
continual transfer of system ‘‘bits’’ from one context to
another. No decisive rupture actually takes place, rather a
never-ending series of small adjustments. The implemen-
tation of a VACMA dead-man system on trams has thus
barely drawn attention since it merely reflects a system that
has proven its worth a long time ago.
This lack of attention shown VACMA also exposes a
waning interest in the profession of transit driver. For
designers and managers alike, innovation only rarely tends
to incite a preliminary evaluation of the types of situations
being transformed. According to this same rationale,
innovation benefits are not typically compared with the
reality of the underlying activity. The notion that tasks will,
come what may, get done still predominates.
It is not at all surprising to observe certain ‘‘disjoint-
edness’’ in the innovation process with respect to produc-
tion realities. The devices associated with standards and
controls that have been developed and harmonized, prod-
ded by European unification and market globalization, may
thus constitute another kind of dislocation, which is very
real and both necessary and sufficient for inciting innova-
tion. This view of innovation economics, which favors
accommodating the demands inherent in controls and
standards over production realities, thereby lends credence
to a process of ‘‘cultural alienation’’ of a group, to the
extent that ‘‘the drive for solidarity among members is
given higher priority than any consideration of the group’s
founding purpose. (...) Over time, a process takes shape
that leads the group’s entire organizational culture to an
obscure perception of what the group is really supposed to
be representing’’ (Sigaut 1990). The imaginary associa-
tions with ‘‘dead-man’’ control in the field of rail transit
depict such a process rather well.
These sorts of meanders become possible since a gap
forms between the design of a new technical object, its
certification and its ultimate uses. As part of the innovation
validation process, controlling standards and respecting
procedures have overtaken justifying a given function. To a
certain extent, we’re now ‘‘on our own’’, with no longer
the need to justify why something was done since ‘‘it goes
without saying’’: all that needs to be said now is how it got
done. In the case of the tram-train, setting the dead-man
time delay can be discussed ad infinitum without ever
questioning its purpose. With the Translohr vehicle, when
the steering wheel was eliminated to become a tramcar, no
effort was undertaken to determine whether it was rea-
sonable to have opted not to equip it previously with
VACMA since the functional similarities were obvious.
When it comes to design, the standard has thus supplanted
the inherent work function.
The reintroduction of technical objects into a more open
social context would help prevent the design process from
gong awry. For the time being, technical objects, while
generating considerable discussion on their functionalities,
as deduced from their internal configuration, tend not to
reveal much about their social integration nor about their
eventual purpose and usage; in other words, a question
mark remains over the relation between actual function and
form. This laconic response regarding uses in design and
control aspects likely causes some of the drift between
designer imagination and concrete functionality. Once the
activity itself has been excluded from the design process,
the industry standard becomes the process’s sole bench-
mark, and this alteration in object meaning undergoes
institutional ratification; such a sequence is streamlined by
virtue of imitation procedures that overlook object meaning
during the justification step.
While opening the design process to embrace new social
actors, especially users, does not constitute an original idea
as it lies anchored in the emergence of French linguistic
accommodation (Wisner 1995) or Anglo-Saxon schools of
thought on distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995; Suchman
1987), this research has emphasized the fact that nothing is
really certain in this regard. Directing knowledge acquisi-
tion onto technical objects on the basis of functional
analysis and activity decomposition remains critical to this
process.
Research has also demonstrated the misconception of
believing in the possibility of performing a long-lasting and
continuous reformulation of functional specifications as
part of the design process, since all such processes rely
upon a ‘‘black box’’ economic approach (Latour 1989)
towards a certain number of components—available from
manufacturers as is, like packages waiting to be rearranged.
The ‘‘black boxes’’ only get opened once displacements,
ruptures or innovations arise that shed light on a new
problem context for a technical object. These boxes need to
become slightly less obscure, meaning that the various
design actors, whether they be designers or users, be able to
comprehend what exactly is causing the problem.
Once such explanations have been furnished, positions
can be seen to move, even though challenging heretofore
unquestioned postulates requires more effort given that the
debate gets opened from the angle of working efficiency, a
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point of view often dismissed de facto. The current process
of challenging the use of a dead-man device on tramway
systems, whose outcome can obviously not be projected,
attests to this state of affairs.
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